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The steroid hormone testosterone is widely associated with negative behavioral effects,
such as aggression or dominance. However, recent studies applying economic exchange
tasks revealed conflicting results. While some point to a prosocial effect of testosterone
by increasing altruistic behavior, others report that testosterone promotes antisocial
tendencies. Taking into account additional factors such as parochial altruism (i.e., ingroup
favoritism and outgroup hostility) might help to explain this contradiction. First evidence
for a link between testosterone and parochial altruism comes from recently reported data
of male soccer fans playing the ultimatum game. In this study high levels of endogenous
testosterone predicted increased altruistic punishment during outgroup interactions and
at the same time heightened ingroup generosity. Here, we report findings of another
experimental task, the prisoner’s dilemma, applied in the same context to examine the
role of testosterone on parochial tendencies in terms of cooperation. In this task, 50
male soccer fans were asked to decide whether or not they wanted to cooperate with
partners marked as either fans of the subject’s own favorite team (ingroup) or fans of
other teams (outgroups). Our results show that high testosterone levels were associated
with increased ingroup cooperation during intergroup competition. In addition, subjects
displaying a high degree of parochialism during intergroup competition had significantly
higher levels of testosterone than subjects who did not differentiate much between the
different groups. In sum, the present data demonstrate that the behavioral effects of
testosterone are not limited to aggressive and selfish tendencies but may imply prosocial
aspects depending on the context. By this means, our results support the previously
reported findings on testosterone-dependent intergroup bias and indicate that this social
hormone might be an important factor driving parochial altruism.
Keywords: testosterone, intergroup conflict, prisoner’s dilemma, altruistic behavior, competition
Introduction
The steroid hormone testosterone is known to play an important role in modulating human
behavior, especially during social interaction. During the past, testosterone has been widely
associated with aggressive and dominant behavior, a view that is mainly based on animal studies
or correlational evidence in humans linking endogenous testosterone levels to self-reports or
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personality scales on aggressive and antisocial behavior (Mazur
and Booth, 1998; Archer, 2006). More recently, researchers have
begun to further investigate the effects of testosterone on human
behavior in social contexts by applying economic decisions
paradigms adapted from game theory such as the ultimatum
game or the prisoner’s dilemma. These paradigms allow for a
direct measure of aggressive or selfish behavior under laboratory
conditions, which can then be linked to habitual testosterone
levels. To date, studies from this context revealed inconsistent
results with some suggesting that testosterone promotes prosocial
behavior such as increased altruistic punishment (i.e., bearing
personal costs for sanctioning selfish behavior and violations
of social norms) or fairness (Burnham, 2007; Eisenegger et al.,
2010; Mehta and Beer, 2010), whilst others report a positive
association between testosterone and antisocial tendencies, for
instance in the form of decreased generosity (Zak et al., 2009).
In addition to these conflicting results, other researchers did
not find any behavioral effects of testosterone during social
exchange tasks (Zethraeus et al., 2009) or observed both, anti-
and prosocial influences, in decision contexts with or without the
possibility of financial betrayal, respectively (Boksem et al., 2013).
Important to note are the methodological differences between
the above mentioned studies. While some examined the effects
of endogenous testosterone levels (Burnham, 2007; Mehta and
Beer, 2010) others administered testosterone (Zak et al., 2009;
Zethraeus et al., 2009; Eisenegger et al., 2010; Boksem et al.,
2013). Additionally, some studies investigated effects in both
sexes (Mehta and Beer, 2010), whereas others only tested men
(Zak et al., 2009) or females (Eisenegger et al., 2010; Boksem et al.,
2013). One study even tested postmenopausal women (Zethraeus
et al., 2009).
Another possible explanation for these controversial findings
might be that the assumption of a direct link between testosterone
and aggressive or prosocial behavior is oversimplifying a rather
complex relationship. Taking into account additional factors
might help to gain a better understanding of the mechanism
by which testosterone shapes human behavior. For instance,
group membership and social closeness have been shown to
influence altruistic punishment in that ingroup members are
protected more often than outgroupmembers even if this implies
personal costs (e.g., Bernhard et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al.,
2012; Goette et al., 2012). Preferential treatment of ingroup
members and increased hostility toward the outgroup, even
at one’s own cost, are common human behaviors and have
been referred to as parochial altruism (Choi and Bowles, 2007;
Bowles, 2009; García and van den Bergh, 2011). A second
important aspect is intergroup competition. Several studies
have shown that the context of an intergroup competition
alters altruistic behavior compared to an individual setting.
Rebers and Koopmans (2012) assigned subjects to groups and
conducted a version of the n-person prisoner’s dilemma that
included an option to punish defectors of the own group.
They observed more altruistic punishment when the different
groups were competing with each other than during a context
with no intergroup competition. Other studies examined the
effect of intergroup competition using real social groups. For
instance, Van Vugt et al. (2007) found that male university
students cooperated more with their own group (i.e., fellow
students) during an intergroup competition against students
from other universities than in an individual setting without
group competition. Another study investigated the tendency for
cooperation between members of different Swiss Army Platoons
(Goette et al., 2012). Results showed that ingroup favoritism and
outgroup hostility increased in a group competition between the
different Platoons compared to a neutral context, during which
subjects also faced counterparts from the different Platoons but
played individually for their own payoff. There are also findings
from other contexts, such as cognitive tasks, indicating an effect
of group competition on the link between testosterone and task
performance (Mehta et al., 2009), which suggest that testosterone
effects may depend on the type of social challenge (i.e., individual
vs. intergroup competition). In addition, there exists a large
body of literature on the influence of testosterone levels on
behavior during competition. It has been shown repeatedly that
testosterone levels rise after winning a competition and that
high testosterone levels are associated with competitive drive
and the willingness to engage in competitions (for review please
see Mazur and Booth, 1998; Archer, 2006; Carré and Olmstead,
2015).
But what leads to assume that parochial altruism and
intergroup competition might explain the contradicting results
considering the behavioral effects of testosterone during social
interaction? According to a recently proposed theory, the “male
warrior hypothesis,” men are more prone to form coalitions,
engage in intergroup conflicts and they display increased
altruistic tendencies in the presence of an intergroup competition
(Van Vugt et al., 2007; McDonald et al., 2012). Since testosterone
is the predominant hormone in men, it might be involved
in the modulation of these parochial patterns, thereby also
accounting for individual behavioral differences. Based on
this assumption, testosterone might enhance different types of
behavior depending on the situation (individual vs. competition
context) and interaction (own group vs. other group) rather
than being restricted to promote either aggressive or altruistic
behavior.
Initial evidence for a testosterone-driven modulation of
parochial altruism comes from recently published data of male
soccer fans playing a single-shot version of the ultimatum game
(UG) (Diekhof et al., 2014). In the UG two players interact:
the proposer has to offer a share of an initially endowed
sum of money or points to the responder. The responder can
then decide whether or not to accept this offer (which can
vary in terms of fairness). In case of rejection, both players
receive nothing. In this study subjects played in the role of the
responder and interacted once with different proposers, who
were either marked as fans of the subject’s own favorite team
(i.e., ingroup) or as fans of other teams of different rivalry
(i.e., outgroups). The group identities and the offers of the
proposers were predetermined by the experimental protocol,
but subjects were led to believe that they faced real decisions
of former participants. In addition, the UG was played in
two different contexts: a neutral session and a competition
between the groups composed of fans of the same team.
Furthermore, subjects were also asked to switch to the role
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of the proposer and offer a share of 10 points to an ingroup
member and members of the three outgroups. Regarding the
proposals there was no differentiation between a neutral or
competitive context and subjects only made one offer to each
group. Findings indicate that bargaining behavior is highly
influenced by social distance as well as the context. Furthermore,
endogenous testosterone was associated with a pronounced
degree of parochialism. In the competition context individuals
with higher testosterone levels rejected offers by fans of rivaling
soccer teams more often. At the same time, high testosterone
levels predicted higher and thus more generous offers to ingroup
members.
However, norm-compliant proposals in the UG may not
capture true altruistic behavior entirely free from selfish motives
since the probability of rejection and thus financial loss decreases
with higher offers. Therefore, here we report results of a
second game paradigm that was conducted in this study cohort.
Subjects also performed a version of the prisoner’s dilemma
(PD), during which they had to decide whether or not they
wanted to cooperate with another soccer fan. In the PD two
players are asked simultaneously if they want to cooperate with
each other or not. If only one player chooses to cooperate,
the other one receives maximum payoff, which makes defection
(i.e., no cooperation) the preferable strategy from an economic
perspective. Nonetheless, it has been repeatedly observed that
humans display a tendency toward cooperation (Camerer, 2003;
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Here, the PD was applied to
test whether endogenous testosterone levels are also linked
to prosocial behavior in terms of cooperation, which would
confirm the previously observed positive effect on altruistic
punishment in the UG. Similarly to the proposer role in the
UG, the PD implies a trade-off between personal payoff and
expectations on the behavior of the opponent, which will
affect the final outcome. However, making an offer in the UG
presumably requires even more complex considerations since the
expectations on the reactions of the responders might also vary
with the different options for proposals that can range between
one and five points. In contrast to that, the PD only leaves two
options, cooperation or defection, which simplifies the process
of weighing up selfish motives against predicted reactions of the
opponent. Consequently, the decision to cooperate in the PD
might be less ambiguous in terms of a financial trade-off than
offering a high share in the UG. Hence, the PD was additionally
performed to obtain more evidence complementing the positive
association between testosterone and prosocial behavior toward
ingroup members in the UG (Diekhof et al., 2014). In accordance
with the procedure described in Diekhof et al. (2014) this task
was played in two contexts: the neutral setting and the group
competition.
We hypothesized that cooperation rates would decrease
with increasing social distance to the opponent and that
this group-dependent behavior would further escalate in
the competition context. Individuals with high testosterone
were predicted to show increased ingroup cooperation
in combination with decreased outgroup cooperation
(i.e., parochial altruism), especially during the intergroup
competition.
Materials and Methods
Participants
50 healthy male soccer fans (mean age ± SD: 24.6 ± 3.5)
participated in this study, which was approved by the ethics
committee of the Medical Council of Hamburg (Aerztekammer
Hamburg). Participants were recruited among students of the
University of Hamburg via online advertisement and flyers. They
were told that they could win up to 15 Euros depending on their
outcome during the PD and the UG (results from the latter are
reported in Diekhof et al., 2014). All subjects were healthy and
reported neither use of medication nor alcohol or drug abuse.
Prior to testing, subjects were asked about their general interest
in soccer via questionnaire to ensure a strong feeling of group
affiliation. This questionnaire included a rating of the question
“How much are you interested in soccer?” on a 5-point-Likert-
scale as well as questions considering stadium attendance or fan
merchandise. Subjects also had to rate all teams of the German
Premier League (Bundesliga) as well as one local soccer team
of the second division according to their own preferences on a
5-point-Likert-scale ranging from 1 (“my favorite team”) to 5
(“my least favorite team”). This rating was then used to assign
individualized “fan identities” to the presented opponents in the
PD, so that subjects encountered either fans of their own favorite
team or fans of other teams of varying rivalry. Inclusion criteria
for this study implied that one soccer team was rated as the
favorite team (score of 1), another team as the least favorite
(score of 5), and that subjects also considered at least one team
as “neutral” (score of 3). Written informed consent was obtained
from all participants before the experiment.
Experimental Design
Participants performed a version of the PD with 40 single-
shot interactions. A repeated version was used to create a
more realistic social setting (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981)
implying several encounters with the same team. They were
told that during the experiment they would interact with other
soccer fans, who were tested earlier, and be presented with their
former decisions. In fact, the decisions and fan identities of the
opposing players were predetermined to test subjects’ behavior
in four different conditions: interactions with (a) fans of the
subject’s own favorite soccer team (ingroup), (b) fans of the
most disliked soccer team (antagonistic outgroup), (c) fans of
a soccer team that was rated as neutral by the subject (neutral
outgroup), and (d) fans of an unknown cricket team (unknown
outgroup). Hence, the teams in the first three different conditions
were selected individually according to the participant’s prior
preference rating. At the beginning of each round in the game
both players were endowed with 20 points. If the two players
decided to cooperate, both received 40 points. In case of defection
(no cooperation) at both sides, the two players both kept their
initial 20 points. Maximum payoff, however, could be won if one
player decided to keep his points whilst the other cooperated.
In this case the defector received 60 points and the other
player got nothing. Participants were told that their achieved
sum of points over all interactions would later be converted
to real money, but the exact conversion factor for points to
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Euros was not given in order to prevent the decision making
progress being disturbed by concurrent computing. Each of the
four conditions was represented by ten trials, of which three
involved defection by the other player. Trials were presented
in pseudorandomized order and counterbalanced for condition
transitions. Each trial began with a start frame indicating a new
interaction. After this, participants were shown a male silhouette
with small team logos and the written team name beneath it
representing the second player. The first name as well as the
last name’s initial of the in actual fact fictive second player
were also presented to increase authenticity of the game and
emphasize the social nature of the task (for a similar approach
see Sanfey et al., 2003). Next, participants were asked whether
or not they would like to cooperate with this person and to
indicate their decision via right or left button press. After this,
feedback on the second player’s decision and the outcome was
given (Figure 1). The PD was played in two different contexts:
during the first session, participants were told to maximize their
own outcome (neutral context). In the second session, however,
they were instructed that they could win extra points if their
own team, which included all fans of the same soccer team,
would finally outperform the other teams (competition context).
Consequently, in this session participants have to reduce selfish
impulses in interactions with ingroup members (i.e., choosing
to cooperate instead of defecting) to ensure maximum payoff.
Again, we refrained from informing the subjects about the exact
amount of extra points to be won during the competition.
This was done for similar reasons as with the conversion
factor. In fact, the extra reward of the PD competition context
constituted 20% of the total points that could be won during
the whole experiment. Notably, subjects neither asked for the
extra sum of points nor the conversion to money. Written
instructions were given before both sessions (see Supplementary
Material) and a short training version was conducted before
the start of the real session. In both sessions participants also
completed a version of the UG (for results see Diekhof et al.,
2014). The order of the two games was counterbalanced across
participants, but the neutral sessions were always completed
first.
Saliva Samples and Assays
Participants provided five saliva samples over a period of
2 h in the morning of the test day to determine salivary
concentrations of free testosterone. Sampling began at home
directly after waking up and continued with an interval of
30min to ensure a representative sample controlling for highly
variable concentrations due to fluctuating secretion patterns.
During collection subjects were instructed to refrain from
eating, smoking, chewing gum, and drinking anything besides
water. Tooth brushing was allowed after the first sample, but
not immediately before collecting the second. Samples were
collected in 2ml polypropylene Eppendorf tubes and frozen
at −20◦C until further analysis. Before assaying, all samples
were thawed and mixed by vortex and centrifuged at RCF
604 × g for 5min (i.e., 3000 rpm in a common Eppendorf
Minispin centrifuge) to separate saliva from mucins and other
residuals. Aliquots were prepared by mixing equal volumes
of each of the five samples. Samples that were not clear and
colorless were left out to exclude blood contaminated saliva.
Therefore, some aliquots contained saliva of less than five
samples. Salivary concentration of free testosterone was assessed
using an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) kit by
Demeditec Diagnostics with a sensitivity of 2.2 pg/ml (denoted
intra-assay coefficients of variation: 6.58% at 90.8 pg/ml, inter-
assay variation: 7.4% at 74.3 pg/ml). All samples were assayed
twice and two control samples (low and high) were also added.
Two assay kits were used since the sample size extended assay
space.
Statistical Analyses
All statistical analyses were performed with SPSS 19. First,
mean cooperation rates for each participant in each condition
were determined. One subject had to be excluded from further
analyses due to a technical error, which prevented the completion
of the second experimental session. Repeated-measures ANOVA
was used to test for an effect or interaction of the factors
“team” and “context” on the cooperation rates. Wilcoxon-rank
tests were conducted as post hoc comparisons. To identify
possible associations between testosterone and cooperation
FIGURE 1 | Experimental paradigm. Each trial started with a start frame
informing the subject that now there will be a new interaction. Next, subjects
saw a male silhouette representing the second player along with two small
soccer team logos as well as the written name of the team to indicate the
second player’s favorite team. The first name and initial of the last name of
the opponent was presented to increase plausibility of a real person. After
this, subjects were asked to decide whether or not they would like to
cooperate with the opposing player. They indicated their response via right or
left button press. The second player’s decision was then revealed along with
feedback on the outcome according to the subject’s decision.
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rates Spearman rank correlations were used. Furthermore,
testosterone levels were compared between subjects displaying
a high or low parochial pattern with independent t-Tests. For
this purpose, the ingroup bias for each subject was determined
by calculating the difference between the cooperation rates
with the ingroup and the antagonistic outgroup during the
competition. Accordingly, a high value of ingroup bias indicated
more cooperation with the ingroup relative to the antagonistic
outgroup, whereas a low value represented the opposite.
Median-split was then used to divide the sample in two groups:
subjects with an ingroup bias above the median of 90% (i.e.,
the “parochialists,” n = 23; all subjects in this group had an
ingroup bias of 100%) and subjects below the median (i.e., the
“individualists,” n = 20; ingroup bias [mean ± sem]: 43.00 ±
7.54%). Significances are reported two-tailed if not otherwise
indicated and one-tailed in case of directed a priori hypotheses.
Results
First, we investigated the effect of groupmembership and context
on cooperative behavior. A 4 (team: ingroup, neutral outgroup,
unknown outgroup, antagonistic outgroup)× 2 (context: neutral
session, competition) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed
highly significant effects for context [F(1, 48) = 12.69, p = 0.001,
η
2
p = 0.21] and team [F(3, 144) = 85.22, p < 0.001, η
2
p =
0.64] as well as an interaction between the factors team and
context [F(3, 144) = 23.40, p < 0.001, η
2
p = 0.33]. Post-hoc
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests showed that cooperation rates were
lower in the competitive context than during the neutral session
(Z = −3.58, p < 0.001, n = 49; cooperation rate [mean ±
sem]: neutral session = 34.76 ± 3.19%, competition = 25.52 ±
2.10%). Further, cooperation rates increased with increasing
social distance resulting in significant differences between the
cooperation with the different teams except for the comparison
between the neutral and the unknown team, which only reached
statistical trend level (Z = −5.85, p = 0.97, n = 49). The “team”
× “context” interaction was mainly accounted for by significant
higher cooperation rates with ingroup members during the
competition than during the neutral session (Z = −3.03,
p = 0.002, n = 49) and significantly lower cooperation rates
with neutral, unknown, and antagonistic outgroup during the
competition than during the neutral session (neutral outgroup:
Z = −4.33, p < 0.001; unknown outgroup: Z = −4.69, p <
0.001; antagonistic outgroup: Z = −3.50, p < 0.001; n = 49).
Figure 2 shows mean cooperation rates with all teams in both
sessions. In addition, Table 1 lists all mean cooperation rates as
well as the behavioral change in cooperation rates during the
competition as compared to the neutral context (1context =
cooperation rate competition—cooperation rate neutral session).
Considering a possible effect of testosterone on this parochial
pattern, a trend for a positive correlation between testosterone
and the cooperation rates with the ingroup during the
competition was found (Rho = 0.218, p = 0.051, one-sided).
This relationship was even more pronounced regarding the
effect of context as described by the change in cooperation
from the competition to the neutral session [i.e., 1context
(ingroup): Rho = 0.259, p = 0.036, one-sided]. Correlations are
FIGURE 2 | Cooperation rates in the prisoner’s dilemma. Cooperation
rates decreased with increasing social distance to the opposing player’s team.
The group competition context further accentuated this parochial pattern
resulting in increased cooperation rates with ingroup members whereas
outgroup cooperation decreased (*p < 0.01, **p < 0.001). Error bars indicate
standard errors from mean (SEM).
depicted in Figure 3. In contrast to that, there were no equivalent
correlations with ingroup cooperation during the neutral session
(Rho = −0.139, p = 0.342) or with the overall ingroup
cooperation rate across both sessions (Rho = -0.013, p = 0.931).
To further investigate the effect of testosterone on parochial
altruism, we compared the testosterone levels between subjects
showing an increased ingroup bias during the competition
and subjects that did not differentiate so much between the
different teams (i.e., the “parochialists” as compared to the
“individualists”). Testosterone levels of the parochialists were
significantly higher than those of individualists [t(41) = −2.30,
p = 0.027, d = 0.72; testosterone concentrations [mean ±
sem] parochialists: 135.10 ± 8.66 pg/ml, individualists: 109.18 ±
6.88 pg/ml]. Figure 4 shows mean testosterone concentrations of
both groups. Please also refer toTable 1 to findmean cooperation
rates of parochialists and individualists in comparison with
those of the whole sample. Interestingly, by following their
strategy of increased outgroup hostility and ingroup favoritism
parochialists still achieved fewer total payoffs in the competition
than individualists [t(41) = 5.18, p < 0.001, d = 1.62; total
points [mean ± sem] parochialists: 1647.83 ± 19.83 points,
individualists: 1797.00 ± 20.79 points]. This was also reflected
by higher overall cooperation rates of parochialists during the
competition compared to the individualists (U = 56.50, p <
0.001; overall cooperation rate [mean ± sem] parochialists:
37.77± 3.12 %, individualists: 20.41± 3.10 %).
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to resolve the contradiction
regarding the behavioral effects of testosterone (prosocial vs.
antisocial) by considering two additional factors, namely group
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TABLE 1 | Cooperation rates in the prisoner’s dilemma.
Team Mean cooperation rate [%] ± SEM
Sample Neutral session Competition Contextual difference of
cooperation rates (1context:
competitive—neutral session)
Ingroup All: 58.16 ± 5.46 76.55± 4.84 18.39± 5.49
Parochialists: 66.96 ± 8.35 100.00± 0.00 33.04± 8.35
Individualists: 46.00 ± 8.22 45.55± 7.65 −0.45± 7.12
Neutral outgroup All: 39.86 ± 5.02 15.31± 4.34 −24.55± 5.09
Parochialists: 54.78 ± 8,24 25.65± 8.52 −29.13± 9.62
Individualists: 22.65 ± 5.86 6.00± 2.34 −16.65± 5.27
Unknown outgroup All: 30.61 ± 4.33 9.18± 2.99 −21.43± 3.58
Parochialists: 32.17 ± 6.69 10.00± 4.87 −22.17± 5.90
Individualists: 25.00 ± 6.18 6.00± 3.03 −19.00± 5.47
Antagonistic outgroup All: 10.41 ± 2.54 1.04± 0.53 −9.37± 2.65
Parochialists: 12.61 ± 4.76 0.00± 0.00 −12.61± 4.76
Individualists: 9.50 ± 2.85 2.55± 1.25 −6.90± 3.35
Means and standard errors (SEM) for the different experimental conditions (team and context) for all participants (n = 49) and for individuals displaying a high ingroup bias during the
competition (“parochialists,” n = 23) or a low ingroup bias (“individualists,” n = 20).
FIGURE 3 | Effect of testosterone on ingroup cooperation. High
testosterone levels were associated with increased ingroup cooperation during
the group competition relative to the neutral context (1context: cooperation
rates competition—neutral context).
membership and intergroup competition. To test this, male
soccer fans played the PD twice, in a neutral and in a group
competition context, against counterparts marked as soccer
fans of other teams of varying rivalry to the subject’s own
favorite team. Three major findings emerged: firstly, our results
demonstrate the parochial nature of human cooperation with
increasing social distance and enmity to the opposing player
resulting in decreased cooperation rates. This parochial pattern
was observed in both contexts, but was even more prominent
during the intergroup competition. The presence of external
threat by the competing teams seemed to have intensified
parochial tendencies.
FIGURE 4 | Testosterone levels predict parochialism. Subjects displaying
a higher tendency for parochial altruism during the competition (i.e., individuals
who showed increased cooperation with the ingroup relative to the
antagonistic outgroup) had significantly higher testosterone levels than
subjects who did not show such a strong ingroup bias (*p < 0.05). Error bars
indicate standard errors of the mean (SEM).
Secondly, the present findings suggest testosterone to promote
prosocial behavioral tendencies during ingroup interactions
since high levels of testosterone were associated with increased
cooperation rates with ingroup members during the competitive
relative to the neutral context. The fact that an association
between testosterone and altruistic behavior could only be found
in interactions with the ingroup, suggests a modulating role of
testosterone in parochial altruism, which might facilitate group
coherence. This thought was supported by the observation that
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individuals with increased ingroup bias during the competition
had significantly higher testosterone levels than individuals who
did not differentiate so much between the different groups.
Finally, the observed associations between testosterone and
parochial altruism were limited to the group competition or the
behavioral adaptation represented by the change in cooperation
rates from the competitive as compared to the neutral context.
Thus, competition might be a contextual aspect that plays
an important role in explaining the effects of testosterone on
parochial altruism.
Taken together, the data from the PD complement the
previously reported results regarding altruistic punishment in
the UG (Diekhof et al., 2014), during which participants
displayed the same parochial pattern in their rejection rates
(i.e., increasing rejection rates with increasing social distance).
Hence, cooperative behavior seems to be affected by parochial
tendencies in a similar manner as altruistic punishment. This
corresponds to findings from other studies investigating the
impact of group membership in social exchange tasks that
investigated other types of group membership such as different
linguistic language groups of New Guinea (Bernhard et al., 2006)
or members of different platoons of the Swiss Army (Goette
et al., 2012). Also, the further escalation of ingroup favoritism
and outgroup hostility during the competition conforms well
to the results of the UG that showed pronounced parochial
altruism in a context of intergroup conflict (Diekhof et al., 2014).
Important to note, less cooperation with the three outgroups
consequently led to higher payoff in the competition than in
the neutral context. Nonetheless, the argument that this was
due to economically rational behavior rather than parochial
altruism is doubtful. First, defection was mainly restricted to
outgroups whereas during ingroup interactions altruistic choices
for cooperation were observed. Secondly, in the UG outgroup
offers were rejected more often during the competition even
though in this game this unfavorable treatment involved personal
costs (Diekhof et al., 2014). In addition, our results are in line
with the observations by Goette et al. (2012), who applied a
PD and found that in the context of an intergroup competition
between the different Army platoons ingroup cooperation as
well as defection in outgroup interactions strongly increased.
Hence, the present data fit well into the theoretical framework
proposing that intergroup competitionmay have been the driving
force for the co-evolution of parochialism and altruism (Choi
and Bowles, 2007). Potentially impeding the interpretation of
the present results might be the fact that subjects did not know
the exact conversion factor according to which their achieved
points were translated into Euros. However, previous studies on
decision making during interactions with in- and outsiders have
applied all sorts of financial incentives in game theoretic tasks,
but nonetheless have all observed prosocial behavior in favor of
the own group, which corresponds to our results (e.g., points
representing real money in the study by Goette et al., 2012 or even
hypothetical endowments as in Campanhã et al., 2011). Further,
the sum of the extra group reward was not explicitlymentioned to
the subjects, which would allow for an alternative explanation of
increased ingroup cooperation during the competition: for all the
subjects knew, the extra reward could have as well outweighed the
personal loss caused by ingroup cooperation. Nevertheless, when
interpreting the subjects’ motives to cooperate with ingroup
members during the competition it has to be taken into account
that only two out of the 50 subjects played completely selfish in
the neutral context. This observation is relevant as it suggests that
subjects discriminated between the different groups even in the
absence of an extra group reward. A possible explanation for this
might be that strong emotions of enmity and affiliation between
soccer fans dampen the impulse to play economically in the first
place (i.e., neutral context). Therefore, it seems plausible that
increased ingroup cooperation during the competition indicates
parochial altruism rather than a financial strategy.
Considering possible effects of endogenous testosterone, a
positive correlation with the change of ingroup cooperation rates
from the competitive as compared to the neutral setting emerged.
This matches the previous findings from the UG, during which
higher salivary testosterone levels were predictive of higher
offers to ingroup members (Diekhof et al., 2014). In addition
to that, in the UG high testosterone individuals displayed
increased outgroup hostility in the form of higher rejection rates
toward outgroup proposals during the competitive relative to
the neutral context. The PD, however, revealed no specific link
between testosterone and outgroup hostility. A possible reason
for the absence of an outgroup-directed association between
testosterone and aggressive behavior might lie in the specific
demands of the PD. While the decision to reject an offer in the
UG might in fact indicate an individual’s willingness to harm the
other player, the decision for no cooperation in the PD might as
well result from the intention to protect oneself from exploitation
rather than representing an aggressive act against the other player
(Rusch, 2014). Thus the PD might not capture outgroup hostility
as good as the UG, which could explain the lack of an association
between testosterone and outgroup-directed aggression in the
present data. In sum, the present results disprove the notion that
testosterone is promoting solely antisocial behavior since high
levels were associated with increased cooperative behavior in the
form of stronger ingroup favoritism. This supports findings from
other recent studies reporting prosocial effects of testosterone
(Burnham, 2007; Eisenegger et al., 2010; Mehta and Beer, 2010)
and points to a more complex role of testosterone in the
modulation of human social behavior.
Most importantly, salivary testosterone levels predicted
parochial tendencies during the group competition. Testosterone
concentrations were higher in subjects displaying a strong
ingroup bias than in subjects who treated the teamsmore equally.
Besides the stronger discrimination between the different groups,
parochial subjects also won fewer points in the competition than
the individualists. This might suggest that besides enhancing
ingroup bias, testosterone also facilitates withstanding the
impulse to maximize personal payoff for in order to ensure group
success. To add further support to this claim we looked again
into the data obtained during the UG (Diekhof et al., 2014)
and compared behavior in this game between the parochialists
and the individualists (as defined here in the present analyses).
Matching the findings from the PD, in the UG parochialists
showed higher rejection rates in response to unfair offers
by antagonistic outgroup members than individualists thereby
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refraining from the offered points (U = 155, p = 0.013;
rejection rates [mean ± sem] parochialists: 98.26 ± 1.20 %,
individualists: 84.00± 6.26%). The observed association between
testosterone and parochial altruism in the PD fits well with our
previously proposed hypothesis of testosterone as a driving force
of intergroup bias. It also conforms well with the “male warrior
hypothesis,” which states that specifically males should be more
likely to form coalitions and direct aggression toward outgroups
during group competitions (Van Vugt et al., 2007; Van Vugt
and Park, 2009; McDonald et al., 2012). Since testosterone is
the most important sex hormone in males and its role in social
behavior has been well described (e.g., Eisenegger et al., 2011),
it is reasonable to assume a link between prevalent testosterone
levels and parochial altruism in males. The present findings
support this assumption by offering evidence for a testosterone-
modulated intergroup bias in a group competition context.
Further important to note is that here we report individual
differences concerning parochial altruism that were associated
with endogenous testosterone levels. However, we cannot
exclude possible interferences by other factors, which were not
considered in this study. For instance, genetic polymorphisms in
the androgen receptor gene might mediate individual behavioral
differences that are associated with testosterone. Other open
questions that require further research concern influences and
interactions by other steroid hormones, such as estrogens, and,
especially in this context, if there are comparable effects in
females. Against this background, future studies should repeat a
similar paradigm and include additional factors to substantiate
the observed link between testosterone and parochial
altruism.
Conclusion
This study provides further evidence to the view that testosterone
does not only promote antisocial behavioral tendencies, but also
facilitates altruism. This was shown here to be specifically the
case during an intergroup competition in human males. In this
context, testosterone was predictive of parochial altruism (i.e.,
the favorable treatment of ingroup members, whereas aggression
is directed toward the outgroup) and thus was associated
with both aggressive and cooperative behavior depending on
group membership and competition. The present results are
therefore in line with previously stated theories on male coalition
building (i.e., “male warrior hypothesis”; Van Vugt et al., 2007)
and evolutionary theories on the development of altruism and
parochialism (Choi and Bowles, 2007). As a novel finding,
they propose testosterone to play a key role in these social
mechanisms.
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